speaking, "fourth generation warfare" includes all forms of
conflict where the other side refuses to stand up and fight
fair. What distinguishes 4GW from earlier generations is that
typically at least one side is something other than a military
force organized and operating under the control of a national
government, and one that often transcends national
If we look at
the development of warfare in the modern era, we see three
distinct generations ... Third generation warfare was
conceptually developed by the German offensive in the spring
of 1918 ... Is it not about time for the fourth generation to
appear? Lind, Nightengale, Wilson, et. al., Marine Corps
Gazette, October 1989
The attacks on
the Pentagon and World Trade Center are horrific examples of
operations as part of a campaign conducted according to fourth
generation principles. They dispelled forever the notion that
4GW is just "terrorism" or something that happens only in
poverty-stricken Third World countries. But it is a strange
form of warfare, one where, for example, military force plays
a much smaller (though still critical) role than in earlier
generations, often supporting initiatives that are more
political, diplomatic, and economic. As important as finding
and destroying the actual combatants, for example, is drying
up the bases of popular support that allow them to plan and
then execute their attacks. Perhaps most odd of all, being
seen as "too successful" militarily may create a backlash,
making the opponent's other elements of 4GW more
The authors of
one of the first papers on the subject captured some of this
strangeness when they predicted:
between war and peace will be blurred to the vanishing point.
It will be nonlinear, possibly to the point of having no
definable battlefields or fronts. The distinction between
'civilian' and 'military' may disappear.
Is 4GW Just
Another Word for "Terrorism"?
(defined as seemingly gratuitous violence against civilians
and non-combatants) can occur in all generations of war. Until
recently, in fact, most wars killed many more civilians than
military and not all of this was accidental - recall the Rape
of Nanking, the London Blitz, and the firebombing of Dresden.
As 4GW blurs any distinction between "military" and
"civilian," we can expect more activities that the general
population will regard as terrorism.
because practitioners of 4GW are often transnational groups
without territorially-based armies as such, much of their
activity will resemble "guerilla warfare" or "low intensity
conflict." These highly irregular practices have deep roots in
the history of war. The word "guerilla" itself, for example,
dates back nearly 200 years to Napoleon's campaigns in Spain.
Until recently, however, such "special" operations harassed
but rarely decided-"sideshows" (as T.E. Lawrence once termed
them) in wars fought mainly along 1st, 2nd, or 3rd generation
lines. Examples could include operations by colonial militias
and guerillas during the Revolutionary War, Nathan Bedford
Forrest's cavalry raids, Sherman's March, and the tactics
practiced in the early stages of most "national liberation"
wars in the 20th Century.
Is 4GW Simply
Using Military Force in New Ways?
The premise of
4GW is that the world itself has changed, so that terrorism
and guerilla warfare--and other elusive techniques that are
still being invented--are now ready to move to center stage.
It would be a mistake, however, and perhaps a goal of our
opponents might be to encourage this mistake, if we were to
focus on the techniques and not the nature of 4GW itself. The
place to begin is with fundamental differences between 4GW and
As Col T.X.
Hammes eloquently argues in "The Evolution of War: The Fourth
Generation," social and political changes are driving this
evolution. You can construct your own list of what is
different about today's world than that of, say, 1950. Here
are some ideas to get you started:
exponential increase in the world
worsening income inequities
combined with a general decline in standards of living in
certain Third World countries
non-representative governments in the Third World that use
religious and ethnic animosities and anti-American sentiments
to distract from their own corruption and economic
continuing AIDS epidemic in
parts of the Third World
rise of Third
World mega cities with populations exceeding 20
growth of worldwide connectivity
(CNN and the Internet, for example)
of global transportation (24 hours between any two
increasing scarcity of arable
land and water
explosion in drug
trafficking, with associated money flows and
disintegration of the Soviet
Union and continued instability in that
end of the bipolar world order and
of the interpretation of events through a Cold War
ready availability of small arms
and other weapons from the end of the Cold
resurgence of violent transnational
safe havens for these
groups in areas of Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin America
where any effective government (even if corrupt and
incompetent) is lacking
in wealth and influence of transnational corporations that
sometimes have incentives to perpetuate corrupt,
emergence of US as
the only conventional / economic superpower
If these or
similar factors are indeed driving the evolution of conflict,
then solutions must lie primarily in this arena, that is,
within the realms of economics, diplomacy, and
law-enforcement. Military force will play a smaller role,
performing specific tasks to solve problems that are
intractable through other means. A coherent "grand strategy"
is needed to ensure that military (destructive) actions
harmonize with our overall objectives and do not provoke a
backlash that negates tactical success. Technology is not
unimportant, and may provide options, but the fact is that
lack of suitable technology cannot explain our
less-than-stellar track record in fourth generation
Any discussion of 4GW, since it involves conflicts of culture
and religion, is likely to generate a high degree of emotion.
In the articles that follow, some may find the authors' views
to be simplistic or even offensive. For the record:
Defense and the National Interest does not endorse any
political, cultural, or religious viewpoint. These
papers, however, raise many important questions about the
nature of future conflict, and we are publishing them to
stimulate thought and debate.
Asymmetric Warfare, Fourth Generation Warfare, and Maneuver
Warfare, GySgt Bob Howard, USMC. Teaching 4GW concepts to the
folks who are actually going to have to do it. (43 chart, 547
KB MS PowerPoint briefing - would not convert to PDF, as
sometimes happens with PPT files)
Generation Warfare, LTC Greg Wilcox, USA Ret., and Col. GI
Wilson, USMCR, Ret. A concise introduction to the subject and
brief assessment of our operations in Afghanistan. Presented
at the 2002 Boyd Conference at Quantico. LTC Wilcox's (USA,
Ret.) 4GW experience includes three tours in Vietnam, and
Marine Col. GI Wilson is co-author of the original paper on
4GW. 75KB PDF document.
Consequences, Col Richard Szafranski, USAF, Ret. National
leaders have insisted, correctly in our view, that we must
take the offensive against terrorism. With few terrorist
havens remaining to bomb, however, and with the majority of
active al-Qa'ida operatives likely already in the US, western
Europe, or in countries we are not going to attack, what does
this mean? In this paper presented at the Global Strategy
Conference in Priverno, Italy, May 2002, Richard Szafranski
offers some concrete answers. Ultimately we can prevail: "My
belief," he writes, "is that the September 11, 2001, attacks
were unwise. Monumentally unwise." (55KB PDF file.)
Western Business. British consultant and war correspondent
Giles Trendle warns that as participants in 4GW become more
sophisticated, they will expand their battlefields to include
western businesses, their Web sites, and their e-commerce
Defending Smart, Col Richard Szafranski, USAF, Ret. If the
attacks on September 11 were meant to cripple our economy,
what role can aerospace power play in preventing or defending
against such attacks in the future? In other words, is there a
mission for the Air Force in 4GW? 103KB MS Word document;
originally published in Aerospace Power Journal, Spring
Became Goliath, MAJ Christopher E. Whitting, RAAOC, Australia.
Masters Thesis at the US Army Command and General Staff
College, 2001. 393 KB PDF File. A thorough look at the
problems that 2nd and 3rd generation armies (even very good
ones) face in conducting 4GW.
from Afghanistan," anonymous note commenting on the quality of
both sides and the way the fighting is evolving. Posted
"The Next War?
Four Generations of Future Warriors," Eric Walters, Professor
of Land Warfare, Military History, and Intelligence at the
American Military University. Professor Walters has prepared
this sweeping look at trends in modern warfare from materials
used in his courses at AMU. Rather than extrapolating from
trends in war itself, Prof. Walters approaches the question of
future warfare by looking at what is happening with the people
- the warriors - who will be fighting it. A spectacular
PowerPoint briefing (2.5 MB) and great introduction to 4GW.
For those with slower connections, we also have a .pdf version
(714 KB) with the speaker notes. Bibliography in MS Word (26
Generation Warfare: What Does it Mean to Every Marine? Col
Michael D. Wyly, USMC, Ret. The source of our advantage over
fourth generation opponents lies not in the superiority of our
technology or even of our ideology. In this prescient paper,
Mike Wyly maintains that it lies in the very bedrock of our
society - the Constitution. Those would would wage 4GW must
read, ponder, and understand this remarkable document, to
which all members of the military have sworn to protect from
all enemies, foreign and domestic. [As a colleague of
then-Commandant Al Gray, Col Wyly was one of the prime movers
behind the Marines' adoption of third generation - maneuver -
warfare in the late 1980s.]
New Order Threat
Analysis: A Literature Survey November 2, 1996. Fred Fuller,
Reference Librarian at the JFK Special Warfare Center and
School. Comprehensive survey of the basic concepts of 4GW as
they appeared in the literature in 1996. Good introduction to
to Spirit, Blood and Treasure, Ed. MAJ Don Vandergriff. Why
4GW is the type of warfare we should be preparing for, and
what this means for doctrine, personnel policies, training,
and force structure. From the new book (Presidio Press, June
battle of Shah-i-Kot, by Brendan O'Neill. How a battle that
should have been over in 24 hours lasted a week and hundreds
of bodies turned up missing. Only the absence of CNN kept it
from becoming a second Mogadishu. More troubling, did
Shah-i-Kot demonstrate that our commanders still have a
fascination with "destroying infrastructure," and so fail to
grasp the nature of fourth generation warfare? Link to the
article at Spiked.com.
Generation Warfare is Here," By Harold A. Gould and Franklin
C. Spinney. Why the attacks of September 11 are not simply
acts of "terrorism" but represent the opening shots in true
For those new to
4GW, this is probably the best place to start: "The Evolution
of War: The Fourth Generation," by LtCol Thomas X. Hammes,
USMC. LtCol Hammes observes that "generations" of warfare are
not defined primarily by the technology employed since, to
some degree, each generation can use any available technology.
Rather, generations are better categorized by political,
social, and economic factors. After buttressing his case with
examinations of China, Vietnam, Nicaragua, and the West Bank
(Intifada I), LtCol Hammes concludes this important paper with
the prediction that, "By using fourth generation techniques,
local antagonists can change the national policy of Western
democracies. Then once the Western forces have gone, they can
continue to pursue their local objectives using earlier
generation techniques." Originally published in the Marine
Corps Gazette, September 1994.
Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation," by William S. Lind,
Colonel Keith Nightengale (USA), Captain John F. Schmitt
(USMC), Colonel Joseph W. Sutton (USA), and Lieutenant Colonel
Gary I. Wilson (USMCR). The classic article on why there
really is something that should be called "fourth generation
warfare," and why we should be paying very close attention to
it, whatever it turns out to be. Originally published in the
Marine Corps Gazette, October 1989.
"Is The U.S.
Military Ready To Take On A Non-Conventional Terror Threat?"
Elaine M. Grossman, Inside the Pentagon, October 18, 2001.
Another in ITP's comprehensive look at the changing nature of
warfare and how the US military is - and is not - shaping the
war against terrorism in Afghanistan.
Transformation of War, Martin van Creveld (Free Press, 1991).
An essential reference for fourth generation warfare. Required
reading, at some point, for every serious student of the
subject. Study it until you can say "non-trinitarian" with
"A New Kind of
War," Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, September 27,
2001. Best evidence yet that when it comes to 4GW, our top
leaders do get it.
Battle Like Drug War All Over Again," Hal Kempfer. Once money
began flowing into the War on Drugs, it, and not
narcotrafficantes, became the focus of attention.
Offers Scant Guidance On Handling '4th Generation' Threats,"
Elaine M. Grossman, Inside The Pentagon, October 4, 2001, Pg.
1. Well executed analysis of the new (2001) Quadrennial
Defense Review. Briefly, the parts dealing with 4GW were
pretty much bolted on after September 11, and it shows.
War, (500 KB PDF file) Grant T. Hammond, Professor of
International Relations and Director of the Center for
Strategy and Technology at the Air War College, originally
published in the Spring 1994 Joint Force Quarterly;
republished with permission of author. The techniques and
philosophy of 4GW applied to nation-vs.-nation conflict.
Strangeness persists: war and peace blur and intermingle,
decisive wars are fought with little or no armed conflict, and
operations on the moral and mental battlegrounds determine
victor and vanquished. When it must be used, military force
adds to the confusion and despair of the opponent, rather than
simply bludgeoning him into surrender. Dr. Hammond is the
author of The Mind of War. a recent biography of John
"Letter From the
Middle East (I)" Exclusive to DNI - how the attacks of
September 11 played to a wide cross-section of Egyptians. A
first-person report from the region. Letter from the Middle
East (II) - an update from three Arab countries on the mood in
Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2001," Kenneth Katzman,
Congressional Research Service, 10 September 2001. Latest
comprehensive survey from CRS. "Based on U.S. allegations of
past plotting by the bin Laden network, ... the network wants
to strike within the United States itself." (PDF file on the
of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, United Nations, 1992.
Nations and other groups often fight over scarce resources,
from hunting grounds to farm land to petroleum. In the Middle
East, the West Bank has an abundance of the scarcest resource,
water, and this is fueling an intractable conflict between
Israel and the Palestinians. This report concludes that
"Israeli policies ensure that most of the water of the West
Bank percolates underground to Israel, and settlers are
provided with increasing access to the water resources of the
occupied Palestinian territory. As a consequence, a 'man-made'
water crisis has been brought about which undermines the
living conditions and endangers the health situation of the
Palestinian people." (222KB MS Word) For an update, see
Comment 425, The Struggle for Israel's Soul, August 20,
"Chaos in the
Littorals," Chapter 1 from MCDP 3, Expeditionary Warfare,
April 1998. Excellent overview of the nature of 4GW and the
problems facing US armed forces attempting to find and engage
Urban Terrain Website. As we enter the 21st century, several
Third World cities are approaching 20 million inhabitants.
These environments may present the most severe challenge yet
to our techno-centric doctrines since satellite and
reconnaissance sensors may find it difficult to separate
"terrorists" from "ordinary citizen" amongst these teeming
Revolution in Nepal. "Rain of Shadows," first of a two-part
series in Outside Magazine, September 2001. Just when you
thought old-style communist revolution was gone forever. This
"on-line exclusive" article illustrates how changing
conditions in Nepal are creating a favorable environment for
revolution--where guerillas already control a large section of
western Nepal and are continuing to grow in strength. The
second part, "Last Days of the Mountain Kingdom," describes a
visit to the guerilla stronghold in western Nepal and includes
interviews with its leaders.
The US and the
Genocide in Rwanda, 1994, sixteen declassified US Government
documents detailing why the US refused to take actions to stop
the Rwandan genocide (800,000 dead in 3 months) and even
intervened in the UN to delay measures that might have ended
the slaughter. Unlike France, which seems to have had a stake
in the organizations that carried out the mass killings, the
US was blinded more by simple incompetence and the failure to
recognize the changing nature of warfare. On the National
Security Archives site at George Washington University, August
Nature of the Next Conflict, by Col G. I. Wilson, USMCR, Maj
Frank Bunkers, USMCR, and Sgt John P. Sullivan, LA County
Sheriff's Dept., April 2001. The Soviet Union is gone, only to
be replaced by transnational crime, drug cartels with income
greater than most countries, and wars over water and religion.
Technology is an important player in this new 4th generation
warfare, but it works both ways. Considering the events of
September 11, 2001, a remarkably prescient paper (384 KB MS
Word; reprinted with permission of authors and the Emergency
Response and Research Institution.) A newer version of this
paper is included in Comment 427, 20 September 2001.
The New Craft of
Intelligence, by Robert David Steele. What type of
intelligence, and intelligence community, do we need when the
threat is primarily fourth generation?
An ongoing Case
Study in 4GW: The Al-Aqsa Intifada. Charts and data that show
why this conflict is going to be so hard to resolve. Also
daily reporting from EmergencyNet: 28 Sep - 12 Oct 13 Oct -
The Reality, by Robert D. Steele, founder and CEO, OSS, Inc.
The data on fourth generation warfare as it is actually
practiced in the world today. Why the "revolution in military
affairs" is not the answer.
"Back to the
Future with Asymmetric Warfare," by Col Vincent J. Goulding,
Jr., USMC. "Asymmetric warfare" is "as old as warfare itself,"
as the author reminds us in the very first sentence of this
gripping paper. Drawing parallels and lessons from two widely
separated but eerily similar campaigns--Teutoburger Wald (9
and 14-15 A.D.) and Chechnya (1994-1995)--Col Goulding
illustrates the dangers in preparing only for the forms of
warfare that suit us. In the early 21st century, we seem to
favor high-tech, mechanized combat on gently undulating
plains. Col Goulding concludes that we are inviting future
enemies to engage us in such places as teeming urban slums,
where a simple RPG fired from behind a fruit stand can destroy
a $4 million armored behemoth, live on CNN. From Parameters,
Winter, 2000 - 2001. [DNI Editor's note: "Asymmetric" is not
the same as "4GW," since one of the aims of maneuver warfare -
3rd Generation - is to "hurl strength against weakness."
Undoubtedly, however, warfare in the 4th generation will carry
the asymmetric theme much farther than its predecessors, to
where the participants may not be recognizable as "armies" in
any usual sense.]
in the 21st Century: The Information Revolution and
Post-Modern Warfare," by Dr. Steven R. Metz of the Strategic
Studies institute at the Army War College. An alternative to
the "generations" classification scheme: formal war (including
the asymmetric aspects), informal war, and gray area war. In
this innovative and thorough critique of DoD planning (i.e.,
JV 2010), Dr. Metz takes the official line to task for
focusing on better ways to re-fight the Gulf War. Given his
radical interpretations of modern strategy, though, readers
may find his final recommendations somewhat tame. (361K, 129
pp. .pdf file on the Institute's site.)
by Captain Larry Seaquist, USN (Ret.). As CAPT Seaquist notes,
the fundamental question facing defense planners is "What is
the purpose of the military in the modern world?" When this
question is considered at all, answers range from gunboat
diplomacy (see Comment 381 - esp. Gen Sullivan's article) to
waiting around to see if a peer competitor develops (e.g.,
China). In this ground-breaking article, CAPT Seaquist
suggests that these answers betray a lingering Cold War
mindset and that there are more urgent, albeit unconventional,
uses for military force today. Reprinted with permission from
the August 2000 Proceedings. See also Comment 384.
Generation Warfare: Another Look," by William S. Lind, Maj
John F. Schmitt, and Col Gary I. Wilson. Originally published
in the Marine Corps Gazette, December 1994. An update of the
authors' 1989 paper, which makes the case that future conflict
may revert to its premodern past: Not just armies versus
armies but "Families waged war, as did clans, tribes, cities,
monastic orders, religions, even commercial enterprises."
Stones Can Break an Army" by Stan Crock in BusinessWeek
OnLine. When armies fight teenagers, the "better" the soldiers
do, the worse it looks on TV. Which is the whole idea. Readers
with an interest in the Middle East may also want to consult
Hal Gould's analysis in Comment 392.
"War Isn't a
Rational Business," By Colonel T.X. Hammes, U.S. Marine Corps.
Colonel Hammes argues that the currently fashionable concepts
that go by the name "network centric warfare" will be unable
to cope with any real war, much less the mess that is 4GW. On
the USNI Proceedings web site, July 1998 issue.
undermines democracy, retards economic growth, and may be a
major contributing factor to 4GW. In the latest survey by
Transparency International, the most corrupt countries are
Yugoslavia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Indonesia, Angola, and
bringing up the rear, #90, Nigeria. The U.S. ranks 14th (and
first in perception that it uses unethical practices to aid
its own companies!) Read the complete 2000 findings on the TI
"The Roots and
Fruits Of Terrorism," by Prof. Harold A. Gould. Concise
introduction to the subject, tracing its history and outlining
the socio-political conditions that spawn it. Examines modern
India as a case study in how to (and how not to) alleviate the
threat posed by terrorist groups.
Middle Eastern Groups and State Sponsors 2000. Excellent
survey of the origins and current status of the major
terrorist groups in the Middle East. Ties the groups to their
primary sponsors and outlines US efforts to counter them. 2001
update now available.
Devolving Threat of Terrorism," by Fred Fuller, USAJFKSWCS,
Ft. Bragg, NC, and Colonel G.I. Wilson, OSD, USMC. As
"stateless actors" (e.g., international drug cartels and bin
Laden-style networks) employ increasingly sophisticated
terrorist tactics, our activities to counter (and deter) must
change as well. EmergencyNet News Service, November 30,
Warfare, the Evolution and Devolution of Terrorism; The Coming
Challenge For Emergency and National Security Forces," by
Clark L. Staten, Executive Director & Sr. Analyst,
Emergency Response & Research Institute, 04/27/98. The end
of the Cold War is not turning out to be the dawn of universal
peace. If the U.S. is supreme in the conventional military
sense, those who oppose our interests will find (or evolve)
"A Scourge of
Small Arms," by Jeffrey Boutwell and Michael T. Klare in the
June 2000 Scientific American. The ultimate asymmetrical
threat may be hoards of 6-12 year old kids. No, we don't mean
Reflections, Address by Gen Anthony C. Zinni, USMC, retiring
CINCCENT, to the US Naval Institute. Entertaining,
thought-provoking, and at times disturbing observations by the
senior US commander responsible for perhaps the most likely
venue for 4GW. Excerpt: "In reality, though, the only reason
Desert Storm worked was because we managed to go up against
the only jerk on the planet who actually was stupid enough to
confront us symmetrically--with less of everything, including
the moral right to do what he did to Kuwait."
MAJ Donald E. Vandergriff's thorough and often provocative
study of why the U.S. Army must radically change its culture,
and particularly its officer personnel management practices,
to be successful in 4GW.
"Kosovo and the
Current Myth of Information Superiority," by Timothy L.
Thomas, LTC, USA (ret.) Parameters, Spring 2000. Information
superiority is defined as "the capability to collect, process,
and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while
exploiting or denying an adversary's ability to do the same."
Col Thomas shows that despite total information superiority
dominance, Serbian forces were consistently able to deceive
allied commanders to the extent that we still don't know
exactly how many of Milosovic's armored vehicles we destroyed.
Thomas reinforces Adm Ellis's conclusion that "information
superiority overload can actually hurt mission performance."
Interested readers may want to contrast the mechanistic
definition of "information superiority" with Boyd's concept of
organic design for "command and control."
Increase in Piracy and Armed Robbery" from the International
Maritime Organization. High seas piracy increased by 52% over
last year, claiming the lives of 71 crewmembers. Piracy has
become another profitable activity for international crime
syndicates, and perhaps another indication of the emergence of
"non-trinitarian" warfare (not involving organized military
forces of established states).
Links to 4GW
warfare--wars of "national liberation"--and similar highly
irregular conflicts certainly did not end with the Cold War
and will provide a component of any fourth generation of
warfare. Like these precursors, 4GW will show a very strong
moral dimension. Boyd, for example, observed that guerillas
authority, offer competence, and provide desired benefits in
order to further erode government influence, gain more
recruits, multiply base areas, and increase political
infrastructure, hence expand guerilla influence/control over
population and countryside. ("Patterns of Conflict," p.
To which one
could add today: obtain funds from an affluent diaspora and
influence US public opinion.
In other words,
the moral may be to the physical as three to one in
traditional conflict, but it is much more important to
guerillas. As always, such movements must "swim in the sea of
the people" in order to survive and grow. What better tool for
moral warfare / grand strategy in the 21st Century than the
World Wide Web, which allows participants to spread their
message to tens of millions at very low cost and practically
no personal risk?
Defense and the
National Interest presents a collection of web sites from or
about groups currently waging some form of 4th generation
warfare. On this list, you will likely find our opponents or
allies in future conflict. (Disclaimer-Defense and the
National Interest is publishing these links to demonstrate the
nature of 4GW and the level of sophistication of some of its
participants. This most emphatically should not be construed
as endorsement of the causes they claim to represent.) [DNI
editor's note: You can witness 4GW in action as these web
sites are attacked and periodically shut down by opponents in
of the anti-Taliban United Front, representing the recognized
government of Afghanistan
Mujahiddeen, Azzam Publications, pro-Taliban site produced in
London. Also supports Chechnyan rebels
Hamas, a very
complete site from a movement that has, unfortunately, put
Boyd's advice into practice
well-designed, content-rich site from the largely Shiite,
Iranian-backed Lebanese group. Illustrates how sophisticated
some of these organizations have become in using 4GW
a "moral high ground" site presenting the Intifada from the
Palestinian perspective. Explicitly geared toward Western
Lebanese Foundation for Peace," Web site of the South Lebanese
Army. Group fighting Hizbollah in southern Lebanon.
ETA This is
actually the link to "Basque Red Net," which has some type of
affiliation to ETA. We are looking for a better link.
official web site of this Colombian guerilla movement
very professional, with an on-line store
done, but showing its age
Sinn Fein, which
is, of course, a legitimate political party, but has an
historical association with the IRA. Again, we would most
appreciate a link to an "official" IRA page.
links to national liberation movements
American Scientists' Guide to "Liberation Movements, Terrorist
Organizations, Substance Cartels, and Other Para-State
Entities" Like most FAS products, exceptionally informative
Freedom Fighters, Crusaders, Propagandists, and Military
Professionals on the Net Very extensive collection, and not
just to terrorist organizations. The editor's annotations are
an education in themselves.
Middle Eastern Groups and State Sponsors 2000. CRS survey
provides a comprehensive overview. 2001 update now
over 100 links to resources: maps, articles, photos on 11
September and its aftermath.
If you know of
any similar links, please send them to us for inclusion.
Defense and the